In the current research, we present an operation framework and protection mechanism to facilitate secure environment to protect mobile agents against tampering. The system depends on the presence of an authentication authority. The advantage of the proposed system is that security measures is an integral part of the design, thus common security retrofitting problems do not arise. This is due to the presence of AIGamal encryption mechanism to protect its confidential content and any collected data by the agent from the visited host . So that eavesdropping on information from the agent is no longer possible to reveal any confidential information. Also the inherent security constraints within the framework allow the system to operate as an intrusion detection system for any mobile agent environment. The mechanism is tested for most of the well known severe attacks against agents and networked systems. The scheme proved a promising performance that makes it very much recommended for the types of transactions that needs highly secure environments, e. g., business to business.
Introduction
In a broad sense, a software agent is any program that acts on the behalf of a user, just as different types of agents (e.g., travel agent and insurance agents) that represent other people in day-to-day transactions in real world.
Applications can inject mobile agents into a network, allowing them to roam the network on either a Unless some countermeasures are taken, such agents can potentially leak or destroy sensitive data and disrupt the normal functioning of the host.
In the current research we present a protection scheme for the mobile agents that incorporate standard cryptographic mechanisms into the agent transfer protocol functions. The use of the one-way-hashing and digital signatures is two fold; first detect active, passive and tampering attacks, and second to establish the identity of the servers participating in the anti-tampering program (ATP) [1, 2] . Also encryption is used to prevent passive attacks on the agent's state while it is in transient [3, 4] .
Mobile Agent Security Analysis
Mobility allows an agent to move among hosts seeking computational environment in which an agent can operate.
The host from which an agent originates is referred to as the home host that normally is the most trusted environment for an agent [5] [6] [7] .
In the mobile agent environment, security problem stems from the inability to effectively extend the trusted environment of an agent's home host to other hosts. The whereby an agent always returns to a secure central host first before moving to any other platform [8] [9] [10] .
Some other category of attacks on the agent involves tampering by its executing visited hosts. As such, if that server is corrupted or becomes malicious, the agent's state is vulnerable to modification [11] . Although a lot of research has been done in this area, one of the remaining problems is the presence of an untrusted malicious host that attacks mobile agents, for example; a travel agency's agent system might modify the best offer the agent has collected, so that its own offer appears to be the cheapest one. Also, the travel agency might change the list of travel agencies that the agent is going to visit to increase its chances to propose a better offer and/or get the prices of other travel agencies before making its offer to the agent. All of these attacks involve eavesdropping and
tampering and yet all the published schemes represent a simple mechanism of protection that can not guarantee secure transactions for the agents.
Protection Scheme and its Implementation
In the current research we implement a mechanism by which tampering of sensitive parts of the state can be detected, stopped, and reported to the Master Agent (MA). The framework is composed of different modules. 
The Initialization Module
The concept of MA-SA was first introduced by
Buschmann in 1996 to support fault tolerance, parallel computation and computational accuracy [12] . Also
Lange demonstrated in 1997 that it is also applicable to support tasks at remote destinations and extended it to fit mobile agents [14] . The MA-SA concept is interacting as follows: the MA creates SAs, then the master delegates the subtasks to the SAs, and finally after the slaves have returned the results, the master combines the results. The master can assign more than one task at a time and the slaves can execute them concurrently. A major benefit of this abstraction is the exchangeability and the extensibility in which decoupling the SA from the MA and creating an abstract slave class allows to exchange the slaves' implementation without changes in the master's code.
Depending on the MA-SA concept, we built up a system to facilitate a solution to the mobile agent security problem. To achieve this, confidential data is contained in a secure place that is the MA host (or heavily protected if carried by the SAs). Then the SA must carry essential data to fulfill the task assigned by the MA [14] . Tables 1 and 2 Afterwards it waits for the results which will be returned by the SAs.
The Constraints Module
After starting the initialization module, the constraints module starts running in a supervisory parallel fashion during the transactions. Merging Constraints: which define the relations between subtasks that are generated by the strategies. In contrast to the other constraints, merging constraints are stored exclusively by the MA.
Cryptography Module
The cryptography module provides a secure container for any credentials that the agent might carry and acts as an intrusion detection system to discover tampering. This protection mechanism contains two parts:
a. The read only-state: in which it function to assign part of the "agent's object " as read-only sub-object in which its credentials could not be modified by anyone, and thus are read-only during its travels. To protect such read-only state we have to declare the associated objects as constants and incorporate a cryptographic mechanism to protect these constants.
In Table 3 we list the pseudo code of this object. It contains a vector of objects of arbitrary type, along with the agent owner's digital signature on these objects. The digital signature is computed by first using a one-way hash function to digest the vector of objects down to a single 128-bit value, and then encrypt it using the private key of the agent's owner. The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is used for this purpose [15] .
The verify method of the ReadOnlyContainer object allows any host on the SA's path to check whether the read-only state has been tampered via contacting the certifying authority to honor the user's signature (while it needs an access to the agent's public key.) It uses the public key to decrypt the signature, and compares the result with a recomputed one-way hash of the vector of objects. If these values match, the visited host can assume that none of the objects has been modified since the signature was computed. Thus, the condition it checks are:
h(objs) = K� (sign).
The read-only container mechanism is limited in utility to those parts of the state that remain constant throughout the agent's travels. But in real life, SAs collect data from the hosts it visits and need to prevent any subsequent modification of the data. This could be termed as write-once data.
b. Append-only logs: This object guarantees that the stored entries within it can not be deleted, modified or read by an unauthorized user. When data object needs to be nonmodifiable for the remainder of the agent's journey, it can be inserted into this append only log and to provide secrecy, the data is then encrypted with the MA's public key before it is stored in the log file. We used this module to preserve the results that the SA's had gathered.
The pseudo code of this object is shown in For example, after collecting a quotation from a travel agent, it can check the in-value, in order to protect it from any further modification. The checkIn procedure requests the current server "C " to sign the object using its own private key. The object, its signature and the identity of the signer are inserted into the corresponding vectors in the AppendOnlyContainer. Then, the checksum is updated as follows checkSum = K�(checkSum +Sigc(X)+ C).
First, the signature and the signer's identity is concatenated to the current value of the checksum. This byte array is then encrypted further using the MA's
EIGamal public key, rendering it to be unreadable by anyone other than the agent's owner. Then, the encrypted version of the object would be carried along and protected from tampering. When the agent returns, the user can use the verify method to ensure that the AppendOnlyContainer has not been tampered. As shown in Table 4 , the verify process works backwards, unrolling the nested encryptions of the checksum, and verifying the signature corresponding to each item in the protected state. In each iteration of this loop, the following decryption is performed
KA(checkSum)=> checkSum + Sigs(X)+ S ,
where S is the server in the current position of the signers vector, and X is the corresponding object in the obj s vector. The verify procedure then ensures that
Kt (Sigs (X)) == h(X).
If any mismatches are found, the agent 's owner knows that the corresponding object has been tampered and then it can discard the value. The objects extracted up to this point can still be relied upon to be valid, but other objects whose signatures are nested deeper within the checksum can not be used. When the unrolling is complete, we are left with the random nonce that was used in the initialization of the checksum. This number is compared with the original random number Na. If it does not match, a security exception can be thrown. 
Testing Environment
The basic goal of the testing is to monitor the system behavior against malicious attacks and measure the network utilization for different operational scenarios.
We executed the most common well know attacks for agents, systems, and networks against the proposed system and collected the results to study the feasibility [17] . Five traffic generators are installed and distributed among its testing network to simulate the real world environment. Additional nonnal www traffic is generated while activating and running the system to introduce the nonnal competitive packet dynamics and latencies within the queuing buffers in each router [8] .
The major role of the utilization testing is to evaluate the network resources usage while implementing the framework. Also we perfonned functionality testing of the framework in which "Parallelizing" scheme enables concurrent task execution. In every testing scenario, there is a list of hosts for the SAs to visit according to their respective predefined strategy. 
Parallelizing and Primarily Security Test
In this scenario, the client operates from the VPN host at which he creates the MA Then the MA creates three ASs on the DMZ host from which they start traveling to their designated hosts according to the predefined constraints.
Each SA queries its target host via the dedicated port for such a process. Then each SA will activate a security query to the eVE host requesting security clearance to communicate to the dedicated target hosts. On receiving the clearance it will proceed to collect and/or communicate to the target host. In case of successful transaction, the collected information is returned to MA.
Then the MA prepares the final report and pass it to the user. Note that this is not a fully guaranteed security check, but it helps in some ways to eliminate some security risks especially for home users. 
DDOS Attack Test
In this scenario a malicious software is activated at 
"LINUX MDK or RH" then begin
In here the system information is not collected from hosts in NETI because it suffers from DDoS and host 11
because it does not have the correct name and the last one because it is not the desired Linux machine. But the encryption module will detect this behavior, file it, and report it back to the user via the blackboard system.
The DDoS will not propagate from NET l to the other networks because of the network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host based intrusion detection a e :
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Summary and Conclusion
Mobile agents differ from other techniques in regard to security issues and security mechanisms, whose requirements are not met by classical security systems.
Concerning security in traditional operating systems, the system is always trusted. This is not true for mobile agents, here the visited operating system can be the untrusted one and the agent is the trusted one. The problem arising is that the users have no chance to check the functionality of the operating system.
To eliminate some of the security risks we incorporate a sophisticated mechanism to be built in within the mobile agent design by which none would be able to retrofit into the application. This aim is fully accomplished. The framework limits the risks of leakage and tampering as the data stored in the Master Agent will never be accessible to potential malicious hosts, since it will only reside on Every time the agent departs a host, its server inserts a log entry into the AppendOnlyContainer. This entry includes the current server's name, the name of the server from which the agent arrived, and the name of its intended destination. This travel log can be used by the agent's owner when the agent returns, to verify that it followed the itinerary prescribed when it was dispatched.
If the agent's itinerary is known in advance of its dispatch, we can insert a copy of the itinerary into the agent's ReadOnlyContainer. Thus, each host visited by the agent has access to the original itinerary, as intended by the agent's creator. The receiving host can check the current itinerary to ensure that the agent is following the specified path, and that the method to be executed is as specified originally.
This ensures that any tampering with the method's parameters by any host on the agent's path can be detected, before the agent is allowed to execute. In addition, an audit trail of the agent's migration path can be maintained using an instance of the AppendOnlyContainer class.
One limitation of
AppendOnlyContainer scheme is that the verification process requires the agent's private key, and can thus only be done by the agent's host.
Future Work
Currently we are working on enhancing the IDS feature of the system by adding a backboard system to the encryption module. But in this case we have to implement a rigorous reporting mechanism from the slave agents to the master agent.
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